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ABSTRACT
This Symposium contribution explores differences in how congressional
Republicans responded to Medicare and how they responded to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Given the narrowness of the
constitutional challenges to the ACA that congressional Republicans promoted
and the many federal taxes, expenditures, and regulations that they support, this
Article rejects the suggestion that today's Republicans in Congress generally
possess a narrow view of the constitutional scope of federal power. The Article
instead argues that congressional Republicans then and now-and the two parties
in Congress today-fracture less over the constitutional expanse of congressional
authority and more over the political objectives that robust federal power will be
used to accomplish. Accordingly, the key question going forward is not one of
perceived constitutional limits on Congress, but whether the federal government
will expand or even maintain its role in combating economic vulnerability, a role
that President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society performed to a significant extent
by transforming America from a regulatory state to a welfare state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Call it "Obamacare" if you feel you must, but it does not seem
appropriate to call it an unprecedented assault on the federal structure of
the U.S. Constitution. After all, the Congress that passed the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)' possessed the constitutional
authority to accomplish something substantially more ambitious than the
ACA. Under longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent that was accepted
by those who declared the ACA unconstitutional,2 Congress could have enacted
a law establishing "a government-run, 'single-payer' system such as
Canada's-the 'Medicare for all' approach advocated by many American
liberals for years."'3 Congress did not, however, adopt as its model Medicare,
one of the greatest achievements of President Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society.4 Facing fierce opposition from moderate members, insurance
companies, and many medical providers, the ACA Congress declined to
secure a much larger role for the federal government in healthcare and
insurance markets.5
Instead, Congress passed the ACA, which "seeks to expand the
number of people covered and begin the work of restraining costs by
building on the existing structure of private insurance." 6 The ACA, in other
words, is a "market-based approach" that "bears clear resemblance to the
leading Republican alternative to the Clinton plan, to proposals developed
by the conservative Heritage Foundation, and to the 2006 legislation signed
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social
Security Act's old-age pension program); see also Mark A. Hall, Health Care Reform-
What Went Wrong on the Way to the Courthouse, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295, 295 (2011)
("Under long-established Supreme Court precedent, Congress would have authority, if
it wanted, to enact a single-payer socialized insurance system, using its powers to tax and
spend 'for the general welfare."').
3. THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY
OF AMERICA'S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR Us ALL 68 (2010)
[hereinafter LANDMARK].
4. See, e.g., DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF
POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 163 (2009) ("Medicare and
Medicaid were among Johnson's proudest legacies-two sections of the single most
important piece of health care legislation in American history."). The authors retell the
story of Medicare's passage based on materials that "were not available to historians
who wrote the definitive histories of Medicare's passage." Id. at 164. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, Blumenthal and Morone conclude that Johnson played a direct,
pivotal role from the start. See id. at 163-205.
5. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 2, ("Far short of [a single-payer socialized
insurance] system, the complex blend of regulation, subsidies, and an individual mandate
included in the [ACA] is vastly more protective of insurance markets and individual
freedoms.").
6. LANDMARK, supra note 3.
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by Republican [Governor] Mitt Romney that created universal coverage in
Massachusetts."7 In short, if Medicare could be characterized as top-down
government regulation, the ACA could not; its market-based features were
designed to be ideologically more attractive to skeptics of healthcare reform,
including Republican members of Congress.
What, then, is one to make of the fact that the ACA encountered-and
continues to encounter-fierce political and constitutional objections from
Republicans in Congress? Among other things, one might be tempted to
conclude that congressional Republicans today possess a substantially
narrower view of the constitutional scope of federal power than they did
during the 1960s. Then, many Republicans in Congress ultimately supported
Medicare,8 and those who opposed it did not typically condemn it as
unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality of Medicare never became the
official position of the Republican Party.9 More recently, by contrast,
congressional Republicans lined up in lockstep to oppose the ACA,10 and
7. Id.; see also id. at 6 (noting that President Nixon's healthcare reform
"architecture formed the basis for what Obama would pursue three decades later"); cf.
BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 4, at vii (viewing President Barack Obama's plan
upon taking office as "well to the right of Nixon's 1974 proposal" and noting that "its
closest predecessor was the Dole-Chafee plan constructed as a Republican alternative
to Clinton in 1994").
8. See VOTE TALLIES FOR PASSAGE OF MEDICARE IN 1965, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/history/tally65.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2014)
[hereinafter VOTE TALLIES FOR PASSAGE OF MEDICARE] (reporting that 13 of 32 Senate
Republicans voted for Medicare, as did 70 of 140 House Republicans). Granted, the
Republican Party was not as enthusiastic about Medicare as the final roll-call vote might
suggest. See BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 4, at 186 ("The election [of 1964] had
offered a dramatic choice. A month after being nominated, Barry Goldwater had flown
to Washington and cast his very loud 'nay' on Medicare."); id. at 192 (noting that
Medicare initially prevailed on the House floor with "[o]nly ten Republicans vot[ing]
with the administration").
9. Today, by contrast, more Republican politicians are prepared to declare
Medicare unconstitutional. See Ian Millhiser, At Least One Third of the Federal Speakers
at Virginia GOP Retreat Say Medicare is Unconstitutional, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 8,
2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/12/08/3035681/featured-speakers-virgina-
gop-retreat-medicare-unconstitutional (recounting remarks from Texas Governor Rick
Perry and Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) attacking Medicare, Medicaid, and
Social Security as unconstitutional).
10. See, e.g., LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE
REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, 63-64 (2010)
("[Senate Minority Leader Mitch] McConnell and his Republican Senate colleagues
compelled [Senate Majority Leader Harry] Reid and Democrats to walk a tightrope in
assembling and holding the necessary sixty votes from the ranks of Democrats and
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they endorsed a litigation campaign that attacked the ACA as beyond the
constitutional scope of Congress's enumerated powers.1
If the constitutional concern raised by the ACA's "individual
mandate" and Medicaid expansion is limitless federal power-a rationale for
congressional authority that "lacks logical limitation" '2-then Medicare
would seem to be more of a threat both to the American federal system and
to the negative liberty championed by critics of the ACA in Congress. 3 Not
only did Medicare authorize more extensive federal regulation of private
conduct, but it also did not allow much opportunity for individuals to opt
out.14 If this logic is sound, then the vision of constitutional federalism
animating congressional Republicans today differs substantially from the
vision of constitutional federalism animating congressional Republicans who
supported-or for that matter, who opposed on policy grounds-President
Johnson's Great Society enactments like Medicare.
Constitutional politics, however, is about more than logic. The
foregoing "federalism explanation" of opposition by congressional
Republicans to the ACA misses what may be most noteworthy about the
constitutional challenges that they supported: their narrowness. Rather than
mount a broadside constitutional attack on either the Great Society welfare
state or the New Deal regulatory state, Republicans in Congress endorsed a
surgical strike that was intended to destroy-with apologies to Abraham
Lincoln-none of the laws but one: the ACA.'5 The narrowness of the
Independents alone.").
11. So did the many Republican governors and state attorneys general who
challenged the law in court. See id. at 151. The modern Republican Party, however, is a
complex "they," not an "it." Instead of discussing Republicans or Republican politicians
generally, this Article restricts its focus to Republicans in Congress. For further
discussion of this point, see the Conclusion.
12. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
13. See Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action
Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 74
(2012).
14. See Neil S. Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the "Mandate,"
Legality, and Statesmanship, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DESIGN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 192,206 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger, & Trevor
W. Morrison eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE HEALTH CARE CASE].
15. Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) ("[Aire
all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one [concerning habeas corpus] be violated?").
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constitutional challenges may be revealing. It may suggest that congressional
Republicans today are not substantially less committed to robust federal
power than they were during the 1960s or than congressional Democrats are
now.
The two modern parties in Congress fracture less over the
constitutional scope of congressional power and more over the political goals
that robust federal power will be used to attain. In short, the ACA litigation
may ostensibly have been conducted in the register of constitutional
federalism (and more subtly, in the register of constitutional liberty), but
what was most at stake-and what is most at stake going forward-is a
question of political priorities, not constitutional limits. The question is
whether the federal government will expand or even maintain its role in
combating economic vulnerability, a role that President Johnson's Great
Society performed to a significant extent by transforming America from a
regulatory state to a welfare state. 16 If congressional Republicans succeed in
persuading America to answer this question negatively, it will likely not be
because they perceive an absence of federal constitutional warrant, but
because they prefer to use federal power in other ways.
Part II of this Article illustrates the narrowness of the federalism
challenges to the ACA by focusing on objections to the law's minimum
coverage provision. Part III considers two potential explanations for the
narrowness of the challenges: litigation strategy and substantive
commitments. Part IV anticipates an objection. The Conclusion offers some
qualifications.
II. NARROWNESS
The ACA contains, among many other items, a minimum coverage
provision. It is commonly, if inaccurately, called the individual mandate. 7
The provision requires most Americans either to maintain a specified
minimum level of health insurance coverage" or to make a "shared
responsibility payment" to the Internal Revenue Service each year.19 In
16. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1602-06 (5th ed. 2006) (distinguishing the
post-New Deal regulatory state from the modern welfare state and cogently describing
the rise of the latter).
17. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
19. Id. § 5000A(b).
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius [hereinafter NFIB],
a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the minimum coverage
provision was beyond the scope of Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 0 but the Court
concluded that the provision was nevertheless constitutional because it fell
within Congress's power to tax.21
Throughout the political and litigation campaign that ended up at the
Court, Republican politicians in Congress focused on the constitutionality of
the minimum coverage provision.22 This was ironic, as Republican members
of Congress and conservative think tankers at the Heritage Foundation were
responsible for coming up with the idea of an individual health insurance
mandate during the 1990s as a conservative alternative to the Clinton
healthcare proposal.23 But be that as it may. These congressional critics of
the law asserted that the Commerce Clause disables Congress from imposing
economic mandates-that is, requirements that individuals buy a product
from a third party.2 4 Five Justices in NFIB agreed. This objection to the
minimum coverage provision is legally dubious, 25 but for present purposes it
is irrelevant who is right.
The key point here, rather, is this: Now that the ACA has survived
almost entirely intact, it does not much matter who is right. Congress never
used the Commerce Clause to impose a purchase mandate before it passed
the ACA.26 As explained below, moreover, Congress actually imposed only
20. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586-93; id. at 2644-50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, &
Alito, JJ., dissenting). It is irrelevant for purposes of this Article whether the Chief
Justice's Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper analyses constitute holding or
dicta. For a discussion, see generally Siegel, supra note 14.
21. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-2600.
22. See Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE, supra note 14, at 11, 13.
23. See, e.g., Hearing on the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-
releases/release/?id=debc354f-02d2-4d2b-b564-f4e372381147 ("Ironically, the so-called
individual mandate now under partisan attack in the courts has long been a Republican
proposal.").
24. See, e.g., JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 10, at 91. ("Republicans in
Congress . . . steadily backed away from th[e] originally conservative idea [of an
individual mandate], and, by the end of 2009, were vociferously denouncing it as a
Democratic plot to violate American freedoms.").
25. See generally Siegel, supra note 14.
26. Id. at 204.
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a purchase incentive in the ACA, not a genuine mandate.27 And Congress is
unlikely to want to impose a purchase mandate in the future. They are
politically unpopular, and Congress has other means available to achieve its
regulatory objectives.28 The parade of horribles imagined by critics of the
minimum coverage provision, such as forcing Americans to buy broccoli and
American cars, seemed to have less to do with future congressional
legislation and more to do with persuading the Court to strike down the
minimum coverage provision-and then, having accomplished that, the
entire ACA.29
During the litigation, there was potential cause for concern about
future implications if the Court broadly accepted the constitutional
pertinence of a distinction between regulating "activity" and regulating
"inactivity" under the Commerce Clause.30 For example, Congress might
then lack the power to quarantine or mandate vaccination in the face of a flu
27. Republican opponents of the ACA were so successful in framing the public
debate that it has become conventional to refer to the minimum coverage provision as
the individual mandate, notwithstanding the technical inaccuracy of that label-it
functions not as a mandate but as an incentive implemented through an exaction on
individuals who choose not to purchase health insurance. Moreover, the exaction does
not apply to a wide range of individuals. See Siegel, supra note 13, at 39 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 5000(e) (2012)) ("This exaction is inapplicable to people who need not file a federal
income tax return because their household incomes are too low, to people whose
premium payments would be greater than 8% of their household income, to individuals
who are uninsured for short periods of time, to members of Native American tribes, and
to people who show that compliance with the requirement would impose a hardship.").
28. For a discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the
Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. CoMMENT. 591, 601-03 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Florida ex. rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs.,
780 F. Supp. 2d. 1256, 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (invalidating the minimum coverage
provision and then declaring the entire ACA unconstitutional because "the individual
mandate is indisputably necessary to the Act's insurance market reforms, which are, in
turn, indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act"), rev'd sub nom. Florida ex rel.
Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011),
rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n Of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Balkin,
supra note 22, at 14 (noting that opponents of the ACA sought to "wipe Obamacare off
the books with a single stroke" by contending that the minimum coverage provision was
unconstitutional so that they could then "argue that the entire statute had to fall, because
the Affordable Care Act had no severability clause").
30. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,560 (6th Cir. 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring in part), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) ("Level of
generality is destiny in interpretive disputes, and it remains unclear at what level [the
ACA's challengers] mean to pitch their action/inaction line of constitutional authority
or indeed whether a workable level exists.").
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pandemic.31 But that concern was obviated by the ultimately narrow focus of
the critics and the Court on purchase mandates. 32
One can tell a similar story about the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Chief Justice John Roberts, following some of the Republican politicians
who challenged the minimum coverage provision, seemed to concede that
the provision was necessary-in the orthodox constitutional sense of
convenient or usefu133 -to effectuate the admittedly constitutional ACA
provisions that require insurers to cover people with preexisting conditions. 34
Without the minimum coverage provision, there would be a perverse
incentive for uninsured, financially secure individuals to buy insurance only
when they require expensive care, thereby free riding on people who pay for
insurance when they are healthy. This "adverse selection" problem would
substantially undermine insurance markets. 35  Roberts nonetheless
concluded that the provision was improper.36 It was improper, apparently,
because it violated a new structural limit on federal power that disables
Congress from compelling people to buy a product. 37 He deemed such
compulsion the exercise of a "great substantive and independent power" 3
beyond those specifically enumerated, not an exercise of authority
31. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 13, at 52-53 (imagining a scenario in which the
federal government wanted to mandate vaccination "in order to prevent the spread of a
deadly disease across state lines," and opining that Congress should have the power to
do so under the Commerce Clause, "[i]n light of potentially large spillover effects
impinging on the general welfare").
32. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (describing the individual mandate as
constitutionally problematic because it attempts "to regulate individuals not currently
engaged in commerce" as an exercise of the power to regulate commerce).
33. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819).
34. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (appearing to accept that "the individual
mandate is 'necessary' to the Act's insurance reforms").
35. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 13, at 61-73 (explaining the adverse selection
logic justifying the minimum coverage provision as necessary and proper for the
execution of other ACA provisions that were widely agreed to be valid under the
Commerce Clause).
36. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 ("Even if the individual mandate is 'necessary' to
the Act's insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a 'proper' means
for making those reforms effective.").
37. See id. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(characterizing a prohibition on purchase mandates as "newly minted constitutional
doctrine" and a "novel constraint on Congress' commerce power [that] gains no force
from our precedent").
38. Id. at 2591, 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. '39
This conclusion, too, is legally dubious. As numerous scholars on the
left and right have recognized, the minimum coverage provision is best
understood as a permissible means to the end of guaranteeing people access
to health insurance without unraveling insurance markets.40 Even if Roberts
is right, however, the pertinent question here is how much of a limit he
imposed. How should Congress and the courts distinguish between a "great
substantive and independent power" 41 beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution and a power merely "derivative of, and in service to, a granted
power?" 42 The answer is not clear because Roberts used broad and vague
language. It seems likely, however, that he pressed such a distinction more
for the purpose of deciding this case than for the future. "Having just denied
Congress the power to impose purchase mandates under the Commerce
Clause, he may have been determined not to allow such mandates under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. '43 Language that is so broad and vague that it
potentially means everything likely means little going forward-at least
absent significant changes in the Court's composition. The Court has long
approved much congressional action under the Necessary and Proper Clause
that seems more substantive and independent than a purchase incentive. For
example, Congress has created national banks, deported people,
incarcerated others, and executed still others.44 In all likelihood, neither
Roberts nor Republicans in Congress meant to call any of those practices
into constitutional question.45
39. Id. at 2591-93.
40. See, e.g., William Baude, Rethinking the Eminent Domain Power, 122
YALE L.J. 1738, 1818 (2013) ("[O]ne might even argue that the compulsory purchase of
something one does not want borders on being itself a taking. But on balance, I find that
analogy strained, and I find the historical case that the mandate is a great power seems
too weak to justify invalidating the Act.").
41. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2593 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411)(internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 2592.
43. Siegel, supra note 14, at 204 (arguing that this logic "den[ies] the
undeniable-that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an independent source of
constitutional authority").
44. See id. at 204-05 ("If a requirement to buy a product is always a great
substantive and independent power, then perhaps Congress has long used the Necessary
and Proper Clause to exercise other great substantive and independent powers, such as
creating a national bank.... or, for that matter, criminal laws whose violation can result
in long prison terms or execution.").
45. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2505-07 (2013)
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Congressional critics of the minimum coverage provision also argued
that it could not plausibly be understood as a tax because their Democratic
colleagues had self-consciously used the language of penalties, not taxes, in
order to blunt Republican criticism that the ACA would increase taxes.46 On
this view, it is constitutionally decisive that the ACA deemed the possession
of insurance a requirement, used mandatory language, and even labeled the
exaction for non-insurance a penalty.47 Again, this objection is legally
dubious: the provision has all of the material characteristics of a tax, not a
penalty, which typically matters more for purposes of constitutionality than
the expressive form of the statutory language4 s Congress incentivized
people to stop going without insurance, but it did not prevent such conduct,
primarily because it made the amount of the exaction for noninsurance
modest.49 Specifically, Congress tied the amount of the exaction to individual
income but capped it at an amount equivalent to the national average
premium for "the lowest level of health insurance coverage identified by the
ACA as sufficient to comply with the minimum coverage provision." This
guaranteed that the amount of the exaction would be less than the cost of
insurance for each uninsured person.50 On this point, the Chief Justice
agreed.51
Again, however, who is right does not matter for present purposes.
What matters is how much critics conceded from the beginning. Their
objection was not that Congress could not have structured the minimum
coverage provision as a tax, but merely that it had failed to do so by using
the wrong term in the statute.5 2 In other words, if Congress had called the
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing "with the Court that Congress had the
power, under the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I, to
require [respondent] to register as a sex offender," because "Congress could have
rationally determined that 'mak[ing] the civil registration requirement at issue here a
consequence of [his] offense' would give force to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
adopted pursuant to Congress's power to regulate the Armed Forces" (second alteration
in original) (quoting Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2503 (majority opinion))).
46. See, e.g., Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 411 n.12 (4th Cir. 2011),
vacated 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012) (citing Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1142-43 (N.D. Fla. 2010)).
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(c) (2012).
48. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy:
An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REv. 1195, 1220-21 (2012).
49. Id. at 1241-42.
50. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B), (b)(1), (c)(2)(B) (Supp. 2011)).
51. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2593-600 (2012).
52. See id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("It is
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shared responsibility payment a "fee," an "exaction," or a "tax," rather than
a "penalty," then there concededly would have been no constitutional case
against the minimum coverage provision. That so much should turn on so
little was too much for the Chief Justice, and thus the Court, to accept.
53
By illustrating the narrowness of the enumerated powers challenges to
the minimum coverage provision, this Article makes no claim to originality.
On the contrary, the narrowness of the challenges was apparent at the time
to advocates on both sides. Those who defended the constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision were not worried about dire future
implications if Congress was barred from imposing purchase mandates.
Rather, they were concerned that the Court would adopt a novel, no-
economic-mandates rationale to invalidate this law in particular-the most
significant expansion of the social safety net since President Johnson's Great
Society 54-- especially given the political impossibility of repassage.
55
important to bear this in mind in evaluating the tax argument of the Government and of
those who support it: The issue is not whether Congress had the power to frame the
minimum-coverage provision as a tax, but whether it did so.").
53. Opponents of the ACA argued that classifying the exaction as a tax after
the fact would allow Congress to avoid political accountability for tax increases. This
argument was strained. For a critique, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 48, at 1243-47. In
short, accountability turns primarily on who pays how much, not on what Congress calls
the payment. Id. at 1244. In any event, Congress frequently obfuscates in the Tax Code,
and courts do not deem it appropriate to police such obfuscation. Id. at 1244-45.
54. See, e.g., JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 10, at 3 ("[In the assessment of
many pundits, the new Affordable Care Act of 2010 instantly took its place as a landmark
in U.S. social legislation, comparable to Social Security legislation enacted in 1935, Civil
Rights legislation enacted in 1964, and, of course, Medicare."); LANDMARK, supra note
3, at 66-68 (calling the ACA "the biggest expansion of the social safety net in more than
four decades, providing greater economic security to millions of poor and working-class
families").
55. Cf. JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 10, at 174 (predicting that, even absent
invalidation of the ACA, "a Republican-controlled or influenced Congress might decide
to delay or weaken subsidies to make insurance affordable or nix the taxes needed to
pay for reform"). Opponents of the ACA are challenging the availability of subsidies in
federally facilitated exchanges. See generally Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated pending reh'g en banc, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014);
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 3811246 (U.S.
July 31, 2014) (No. 14-114). All of the briefs in these cases that members of Congress
have filed are politically predictable. See, e.g., Brief for Senator John Cornyn et. al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.
2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 3811246 (U.S. July 31, 2014) (No. 14-114), 2014
WL 4370712, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.comlwp-content/uploads/201 4/09/14 -114 -Amic
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Likewise, critics of the minimum coverage provision like Randy Barnett-
the chief intellectual architect of the constitutional challenges-repeatedly
stressed their narrowness.5 6 It was always primarily, if not exclusively, about
the ACA.
III. SIGNIFICANCE
If the narrowness of the challenges is relatively clear, the primary
explanation for their narrowness may be less so. And the explanation
matters because different explanations have different legal and political
implications. Specifically, has the view of congressional Republicans toward
the constitutional scope of congressional power changed significantly over
the past half century? Or are changes in political priorities primarily
responsible for the hostility of congressional Republicans to the ACA? What
is at stake, in part, is the significance of the ACA litigation for the 50th
anniversary of the Great Society.
One possible explanation for the narrowness of the challenges is
litigation strategy, which may cause litigants to moderate the expression of
their constitutional convictions. On this view, it is difficult to persuade
federal judges to invalidate major pieces of social welfare legislation;5 7
judges, like other government officials, tend to take some account of the
conditions of their own public legitimacy in a democratic society, and they
also tend to sense that their institutional vulnerability may be at a maximum
us-Brief-of-Senator-John-Cornyn-et-al-.pdf.
56. See e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Who Won the Obamacare Case?, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 14, at 17,25.
[A]s I insisted for two years in the face of claims that a ruling invalidating the
Obamacare would undermine the entire edifice of federal programs, all such a
ruling would have done was bar the Congress from using economic mandates.
Here is how I usually closed my speeches on the implications of invalidating the
ACA: "Should the Supreme Court decide that Congress may not commandeer
the people in this way, such a doctrine would only affect one law: the ACA.
Because Congress has never done anything like this before, the Supreme Court
does not need to strike down any previous mandate."
Id. (emphasis removed).
57. Adrian Vermuele, Constitutional Conventions, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2,
2012) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2012)), http://
www.newrepublic.com/book/review/power-precedent-michael-gerhardt (characterizing
the proposition that "the Court should not invalidate major social welfare statutes
enacted by the federal government" as a fundamental post-New Deal constitutional
convention).
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when the stakes are highest." It follows from these premises that litigants
seeking to persuade courts to invalidate transformative legislation are more
likely to succeed if they can identify narrow means of doing so.
This may be the best explanation for the behavior of conservative
libertarians like Barnett, who believe that the courts should be in the
business of restricting federal power and protecting economic liberty to a
substantially greater extent than they have since 1937.19 But Barnett and
principled libertarians like him are academics for the most part, not
Republican members of Congress. And Republican politicians, including
those in Congress, were primarily responsible for moving the constitutional
objections to the minimum coverage provision from "off the wall" to "on the
wall" in record time, as Jack Balkin winningly described the evolution in the
way that many legal observers viewed the objections." For most Republican
politicians, the primary reason for the narrowness of the constitutional
challenges likely lies elsewhere.
Republicans controlled the White House for 20 of the 28 years
spanning 1980 to 2008. Given the phenomenon of partisan entrenchment,
61
it seems unlikely that a general, long-term disconnect would develop
58. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV.
959, 979-1002 (2008) (arguing that judges, like other government officials, are wise to be
mindful of the conditions of their own public legitimation).
59. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, In What Sense is the Personal Health Mandate
"Unconstitutional"?, in A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY AND THE HEALTH CARE CASE 38, 38 (Trevor Burrus ed., 2013) (stating his
"well-known view that the text of the Constitution has a meaning that is independent of
the opinions of the Supreme Court" and noting that he would personally endorse
arguments that "Congress [has] no power to regulate the health insurance business since
insurance contracts-like the practice of medicine-are not 'commerce,"' even though
the challenge ultimately advanced made use of Supreme Court precedent and was not
"an originalist objection").
60. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate
Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4,2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-
went-mainstream/258040/.
61. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional
Change] ("[C]onstitutional revolutions occur through 'partisan entrenchment,' in which
Presidents appoint judges and Justices to the federal judiciary who are thought to share
the broad political agenda of the political party led by the President."); Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045
(2001) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution].
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between what Republican politicians wanted the federal courts to do and
what those courts were prepared to do.62 During this time period, for
example, only Justice Clarence Thomas has advocated a return to the
Court's pre-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 63 Perhaps there would
have been two such Justices had Judge Robert Bork been confirmed. But
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David
Souter, Samuel Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts have not sought to radically
restrict the constitutional scope of federal power.64
A better explanation for the narrowness of the constitutional
challenges to the minimum coverage provision is that Republican politicians
in and out of Congress wanted them to be narrow. And the most likely
reason that they wanted the challenges to be narrow is that Republican
politicians, too, value relatively robust federal power. Examples abound:
* As noted above, congressional Republicans advocated the idea of an
individual health insurance mandate in the 1990s.65
* Broad federal preemption of state tort litigation is more likely to be
championed by probusiness Republicans than by Democrats.66 Broad
62. Of course, the analysis in the text is oversimplified. Senate control matters,
too, which is why Justice Anthony Kennedy has occupied the seat that would have been
occupied by Judge Robert Bork. See Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Revolution,
supra note 61, at 1070.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the
1930's from a century and a half of precedent."); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I adhere to my view that
'the very notion of a "substantial effects" test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent
with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court's early
Commerce Clause cases."' (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring))).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496,2500 (2013); United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005);
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602, 605 (2004).
65. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2322235(arguing that FDA labeling regulations preempt state tort actions for failure to warn
consumers or medical professionals about improper or dangerous uses of a drug because
of "the adverse and disruptive effects of certain state-law product liability lawsuits on
the federal regulatory scheme"). Another amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf
of eighteen Democratic members of Congress. It argued that "federal law does not
preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims with respect to drugs approved by the FDA."
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federal preemption requires broad federal laws that are interpreted
broadly by the courts.
" National tort reform, which is supported primarily by congressional
Republicans, not Democrats, would require a significant exercise of
federal power.67
" Republican politicians have supported a partial privatization of Social
Security, which, as Jack Balkin points out, ironically would "require
individuals to purchase securities and pension plans from private
companies. '68 And now that the Court has taken purchase mandates off
the table, Congress could accomplish a partial privatization through
other means, such as tax incentives.
* Income tax cuts for corporations and individuals rest on the same
constitutional authority as income tax hikes.69
" The massive federalization of criminal law in the United States has been
accomplished with widespread Republican support.70 (Republicans in
See Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, 3,
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851609 ("Petitioner
Wyeth ascribes to Congress a considered judgment to displace state tort remedies and
strip consumers of their right to receive compensation for injuries caused by inadequate
warnings on the part of drug manufacturers. But Congress has made no such
judgment.").
67. See Randy E. Barnett, Tort Reform and the GOP's Fair-weather
Federalism, DC EXAMINER, May 23, 2011, available at http://www.cato.org/publications/
commentary/tort-reform-gops-fairweather-federalism ("Indeed, if Congress now can
regulate tort law, which has always been at the core of state powers, then Congress, and
not the states, has a general police power."); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); The War on
Tort, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 26,2005, available at http://www.economist.com/node/35982
25/ ("Republicans, who traditionally favour local or state control where possible, plan to
assist businesses in reducing their exposure ... by moving bigger class-action cases...
from local to federal courts. Republicans hope that federal courts will be less inclined to
accept less meritorious cases and will award reduced payouts.").
68. Balkin, supra note 22, at 13.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
70. Consider, for example, that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
was invalidated in United States v. Lopez, was part of the Crime Control Act of 1990-
which passed unanimously in the Senate and received 135 positive votes and one
negative vote from House Republicans. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-
68 (1995); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, sec. 1702, 104 Stat. 4789,
4844-45, (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22, 924), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549;
Final Vote Results for Roll Call 534, OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF
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Congress traditionally have been more opposed than Democrats to the
legalization of marijuana for medicinal or recreational use, but that
appears to be changing.)71
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),72 which is presently
being used to attack mandatory contraception coverage under the
ACA,73 was passed by large bipartisan majorities in both houses of
Congress.74 Congressional Republicans and Democrats alike believed
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1990/ro1534.xml (Oct. 27, 1990). But see
President George [H. W.] Bush, Statement on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990
(Nov. 29, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19114 ("Most
egregiously, section 1702 inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a
new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions could
legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed on the States by
the Congress.").
71. See, e.g., Rick Lyman, Pivotal Point Is Seen as More States Consider
Legalizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/27/us/momentum-is-seen-as-more-states-consider-legalizing-marij uana.html
("Demonstrating how marijuana is no longer a strictly partisan issue, the two states
considered likeliest this year to follow Colorado and Washington in outright legalization
of the drug are Oregon, dominated by liberal Democrats, and Alaska, where libertarian
Republicans hold sway."); Jordy Yager, GOP Mum on DOJ's Decision to Stand Down
on Wash., Co. Pot Laws, THE HILL (Sept. 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/31
9737-gop-mum-on-dojs-pot-decision (noting that "[a] stark radio silence is emanating
from Republicans on Capitol Hill in the wake of the Justice Department's (DOJ)
decision this week not to sue Colorado and Washington state, which legalized the
recreational use of marijuana, or other states that have approved its medicinal use," even
though "Republicans have historically objected to the legalization and decriminalization
of pot").
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012) (providing, inter alia, that the
government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" unless that
burden "is the least restrictive means to further [a] compelling governmental interest").
73. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,2755 (2014)
(holding that regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services requiring employers to provide their female employees with no-cost access to
contraception violate RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit corporations); Eternal
Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 756
F.3d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014) (granting an injunction to a religious nonprofit
corporation that brought a RFRA challenge to the certification form that the Court
appeared to endorse as a less restrictive alternative in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., because "[e]ven if the form alone does not 'trigger' [contraceptive] coverage-
whatever that means-it is undeniable that the United States has compelled the Network
to participate in the mandate scheme by requiring the Network not only to sign but also
to deliver the form to its third-party administrator of its health insurance plan").
74. The vote in the House was unanimous, and the vote in the Senate was 97-
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that Congress had ample authority to pass RFRA under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 75
* The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 200376 is either Commerce
Clause legislation or beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated
powers, suggesting that many congressional opponents of abortion rights
do not want to leave the issue of abortion entirely to the states.
77
* Congressional Republicans approved the efforts of Attorney General
John Ashcroft to prevent states from allowing physician-assisted suicide,
including his threat to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who
participated in the practice.78
* Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 9 which
defined the terms "marriage" and "spouse" for all purposes under
federal law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as
3, with only two Democrats and one Republican voting against the bill. Bill Summary
and Status for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d103:HR01308:@@@R (last visited Sept. 25,
2014).
75. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 536 (1997) (finding
RFRA beyond the scope of Congress's power under Section Five). The Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RULIPA) of 2000 amended RFRA after the
Court declared it unconstitutional as applied to the states. See Pub. L. No. 106-274, sec.
6, 114 Stat 803, 806 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2, -3(a)). RULIPA passed with
unanimous bipartisan support in both houses of Congress. See Bill Summary and Status
for the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, LIB. OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN02869:@@@R (last visited
Sept. 25, 2014).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
77. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (rejecting a facial
substantive due process challenge to the law).
78. See Brief for Senators Rick Santorum et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 21, Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623), 2005 WL
1126080 ("The Attorney General has the authority to determine whether physician-
assisted suicide violates the CSA [Controlled Substances Act], notwithstanding the
absence of specific references to the practice in the legislative history.").
79. Pub. L. No. 104-199, sec. 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Republicans
in the House of Representatives voted in favor of DOMA by a 224-1 margin. See Final
Vote Results for Roll Call 316, OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(July 12, 1996), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/rol316.xml. All 53 Republican Senators
voted in favor of DOMA. See Vote Summary on the Passage of the Bill (H.R. 3396), U.S.
SENATE (Sept. 10, 1996), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/rollcall_
votecfm.cfm?congress=104&session=2&vote=00280.
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husband and wife," 0 was defended as valid Necessary and Proper Clause
legislation by congressional Republicans acting through the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives,
notwithstanding the traditional authority of the states to determine
access to the institution of marriage.81
And so on.82 The most unseemly example may be the Terri Schiavo case. In
that series of unfortunate events, Republicans in the White House and
Congress appeared to have little regard for Florida law or Florida courts.83
Instead, they seemed to imagine the federal government as priest, doctor,
and durable power of attorney all in one. 84
80. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
81. See Merits Brief for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group at 3-17,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 267026 (defending Section 3 of
DOMA by citing federal interests in defining marriage for federal purposes, ensuring
national uniformity of federal benefits, preserving past legislative judgments about
marriage, protecting limited fiscal resources, proceeding slowly, supporting traditional
families, and encouraging biological parents to rear their offspring).
82. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 22, at 13 (noting that Republicans in Congress
want to use federal power to impose business-friendly environmental regulations).
Likewise, one cannot implement Representative Paul Ryan's budget or Republican
versions of healthcare reform without the New Deal congressional powers. See, e.g.,
Barnett, supra note 67 (noting that the constitutionality of the Republican HEALTH
Act of 2011 relied "entirely on post-New Deal Supreme Court cases that defer to
Congress-in particular the 'Substantial Effects Doctrine"').
83. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, From Private Ordeal to National Fight: The
Case of Terri Schiavo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/
us/from-private-ordeal-to-national-fight-the-case-of-terri-schiavo.html?r=0 ("As if the
failed attempts at intervention by Florida politicians were not enough of a cautionary
tale, Congress and President George W. Bush plunged into the fray in early 2005,
enacting legislation with dazzling speed to transfer jurisdiction of the case from state
courts to the federal judiciary.").
84. See, e.g., id. ("Was anyone well served.., when Bill Frist, the Republican
Senate majority leader in 2005 and a transplant surgeon, said it was clear to him that Ms.
Schiavo responded to external stimuli, a pronouncement based on his having seen a
videotape of her?"); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Supporters Praise Bush's Swift Return
to Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21,2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/21/politics/
21bush.html ("[O1n Saturday night, when Mr. Bush made the rare decision to interrupt
his Texas vacation and rush back to Washington to be in place to sign a bill that could
restore Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube, the White House said that the issue had become one
of 'defending life,' and that time was of the essence."); Carl Hulse & David D.
Kirkpatrick, Congress Passes and Bush Signs Legislation on Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/21/politics/21debate.html?-rl=&page
wanted=all&position= ("Republicans [in Congress] asserted that Ms. Schiavo's case was
unique in that she was not getting any life-sustaining treatment beyond the feeding tube
1072 [Vol. 62
None of the Laws but One
Ultimately, congressional Republicans seem more likely to be political,
economic, or social conservatives than federalists.85 Moreover, most of the
federalists among them are of the relatively moderate variety, including all
of the conservatives on the Court except Justice Thomas-notwithstanding
the fact that a majority of the Court's conservatives voted to invalidate the
entire ACA.86 Accordingly, congressional Republicans appear committed to
the constitutional underpinnings of the New Deal regulatory state-to
robust federal power to regulate, tax, and spend. They, too, want to deliver
benefits to their favored constituents. They, too, want to use federal power
to express their moral convictions and those of their constituents.
If this account is right, it follows that congressional Republicans today
are not substantially less enamored of federal power than congressional
Republicans of the 1960s, Great Society Democrats, or current Democrats
in Congress. Accordingly, while the constitutional debate over the ACA was
fought in the register of limits on federal power, the two national parties
today divide less over constitutional federalism and more over the political
ends that robust federal power should be used to achieve. The ACA
litigation illustrates primarily how much American national politics has
changed since the 1960s. In ways that were not as true in the past,8"
Republicans in Congress today oppose expansions of the welfare state that
are aimed at providing greater economic security to Americans who lack it.
The ACA litigation and decision, in other words, are significant for the
50th anniversary of President Johnson's Great Society because they
underscore changes in political priorities more than they illustrate changes
and that on video they had seen she did not appear to be in the physical state normally
associated with decisions to end medical assistance. 'Remember, Terri is alive, Terri is
not in a coma,' Dr. [and Senate Majority Leader Bill] Frist said.").
85. For a discussion of different kinds of conservatives in modern America,
see Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139, 1181-1209 (2002).
86. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012)
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). The fight over the constitutionality
of health care reform became so partisan and polarizing-so much a part of the "culture
wars"-that one should hesitate to characterize the votes of the Justices in NFIB as
representative of their general views about constitutional federalism. For example,
Justices Scalia and Kennedy were in the majority in Gonzales v. Raich, and no Justice in
United States v. Windsor suggested that Section 3 of DOMA was beyond the scope of
Congress's enumerated powers. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675; Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 1 (2005).
87. See VOTE TALLIES FOR PASSAGE OF MEDICARE, supra note 8 (noting the
number of Republicans in Congress who voted for Medicare).
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in perceived constitutional limits. This remarkable episode highlights how
much more politically difficult it is today for the federal government to
expand-indeed, to maintain-its role in combating economic vulnerability
and to do so, in part, by engaging in wealth redistribution. That is, in part,
what Great Society programs did, 8 and that is, in part, what the ACA does
as well.89
In May 1964, President Johnson echoed President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt when he told graduates of the University of Michigan that "we
have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the
powerful society, but upward to the Great Society."9 In March 2010,
President Barack Obama echoed Johnson when he signed the ACA into law:
"[W]e have now just enshrined.., the core principle that everybody should
have some basic security when it comes to their health care." 91 Such security
does not come cheap, and it is well-known that wealthier Americans will
bear primary responsibility in paying for it.92 While congressional Democrats
largely support this state of affairs, congressional Republicans largely
oppose it. But judging from how they behave in other contexts, neither group
regards it as violating principles of constitutional federalism.
88. See Joseph A. Califano Jr., What Was Really Great About the Great Society:
The Truth Behind the Conservative Myths, WASH. MONTHLY (Oct. 1999), http://www.
washingtonmonthly.comlfeatures/1999/9910.califano.html ("[F]rom 1963 when Lyndon
Johnson took office until 1970 as the impact of his Great Society programs were felt, the
portion of Americans living below the poverty line dropped from 22.2 percent to 12.6
percent, the most dramatic decline over such a brief period in this century."); id.
("Without such programs as Head Start, higher-education loans and scholarships,
Medicare, Medicaid, clear air and water, and civil rights, life would be nastier, more
brutish, and shorter for millions of Americans.").
89. See, e.g., JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 10, at 4 ("Most new benefits
promised by the Affordable Care Act will go to lower and middle-income Americans-
the people whose employers do not provide health insurance, yet who are not poor or
old enough for existing federal programs, and these expanded benefits are slated to be
paid for primarily by higher taxes on wealthier citizens and by fees assessed on parts of
the health care industry."); id. at 133-34 (noting that affluent Americans also benefit
from the ACA but pay much of the costs of its implementation).
90. Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at the University of
Michigan: The Great Society (May 22, 1964), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperie
nce/features/primary-resources/lbj-michigan/.
91. LANDMARK, supra note 3, at 1 (second alteration in original).
92. See JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 10, at 4.
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IV. OBJECTION
One might object that congressional Republicans, like the Republican-
appointed Justices, generally do possess a federalist constitutional vision-
they just are constrained from expressing that vision in the federal legislative
process by political considerations. On this view, constituent demands for
federal benefits may encourage Republican politicians to vindicate their
federalist vision not by acting to restrict federal power directly, but by
supporting federalist judicial nominees who, if confirmed, would rein in
federal power through the enforcement of constitutional limits on
Congress. 93 Politicians on the left and right have long been charged with
passing the buck on hard issues to the courts. For example, in the late 19th
century, Harvard Law School Professor James Bradley Thayer famously
worried that assertive judicial review would sap legislators of their own
constitutional powers and responsibilities.
94
This objection has the virtue of explaining how it could be that
politicians who do not appear to act like federalists in the national legislative
process nonetheless support federalist judges. (Another explanation,
anticipated in Part II and offered in the Conclusion, is that most of those
judges are not strong federalists either.) The objection, however, has at least
two vulnerabilities. First, it speculates about what politicians may believe in
their heart of hearts, as opposed to focusing on how they behave in the
legislative process. Observing a consistent course of behavior seems more
likely to yield valid inferences about the values that politicians possess.
Second, the objection presupposes that the very constituents who dampen
expression of a federalist constitutional vision in Congress nonetheless
generally elect federalist-as opposed to nationalist-politicians. There
seems no obvious reason why the electoral process would consistently
93. I thank Jonathan Adler for raising this objection with me. See also
Jonathan H. Adler, The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. Sebelius, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 937,
942-43 (2014) (arguing that "[t]he contrasting views of the constitutionality of the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion did not reflect different applications of
settled principles so much as an allegiance to competing principles").
94. See generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1893); see also ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 22 (1962) (asking rhetorically, after quoting Thayer, "in how many hundreds
of occasions does Congress enact a measure that it deems expedient, having essayed
consideration of its constitutionality (that is to say, of its acceptability on principle), only
to abandon the attempt in the declared confidence that the Court will correct errors of
principle, if any?").
2014] 1075
Drake Law Review
produce such a potential principal-agent problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Because this Article has taken on big questions all too briefly, the most
responsible way to conclude is with some qualifications. First, the modern
Republican Party is a large, complicated "they," not an "it." Certain
conservatives were, and remain, interested in limiting the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, including in the context of the treaty power. 95
And Republican politicians in state governments surely wanted to change
the constitutional law of the conditional spending power in their favor, which
was at issue in a part of the ACA litigation that this Article has not
discussed.96 The difficulty of accurately capturing the multiplicity of voices
in the modern Republican Party is why this Article has focused mostly on
Republicans in Congress.
Even limiting one's focus to Congress, there are significant differences
among establishment Republicans and tea party Republicans, including on
issues relating to the constitutional scope of federal power.97 Accordingly,
this Article has painted with a broad brush, and in doing so, has
oversimplified matters.
Even so, there appears to be truth to the proposition that the
ideologically average or median Republican in Congress does not want to
destroy his or her ability to deliver benefits to constituents. There also
95. See generally Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (avoiding
through statutory interpretation the question whether structural constitutional limits
constrain the scope of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
enact legislation to implement a valid treaty). For amicus briefs filed by various
conservative groups that advocated restricting the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, see Bond v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/bond-v-united-states-2/ (last updated July 7, 2014).
96. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberts defined an unconstitutionally
coercive conditional subsidy narrowly. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2601-09 (2012). See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging
Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861,864-65 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (identifying an "anti-leveraging principle," which will rarely
be violated, as the best interpretation of Roberts's opinion on the ACA's Medicaid
expansion).
97. See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE
REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 168-77 (2012) (noting that, in contrast to
the goals of the Republican establishment, the objective of tea party Republicans "is to
dismantle much of what the federal government does").
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appears to be truth to the suggestion that the average Republican member
of Congress does not want to destroy his or her ability to embed the moral
convictions of constituents in federal law. It follows that, in the debate over
the ACA, congressional Republicans were not interested in radically
undermining Congress's powers to regulate or deregulate the economy or to
use the tax code to benefit supporters.
A second qualification is warranted. It would be an overstatement to
suggest that Republicans and Democrats in Congress possess the same views
on the constitutional scope of federal power. Judging from the judicial
nominees that they support or condemn, congressional Republicans appear
to approve of most of the federalism decisions of the 1990s,98 and
congressional Democrats appear to disapprove of most of them.99 Those
decisions changed the constitutional law of federalism from what it had been
during the New Deal, the Great Society, and (for the most part) the 1970s
and 1980s. Those changes in constitutional law, in turn, helped to render the
federalism challenges to the ACA less implausible. The 1990s decisions,
however, imposed relatively modest limits on the scope of federal power-
which, to be clear, remains vast-and the differences between congressional
Republicans and Democrats on this front likewise seem relatively modest.
Finally, although this Article has suggested that congressional
Republicans were and remain more interested in invalidating the ACA than
they were in substantially restricting federal power, it is too soon to know
for certain whether the new limits on Congress's enumerated powers that
the Court imposed in NFIB will prove to be modest or more significant.
Future presidential and senatorial elections-and the judicial appointments
that they produce-will determine the impact of those limits. Only then will
it be known whether a constitutional ban on purchase mandates will be
broadened into a ban on regulating "inactivity," even in an emergency;
whether many other uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause will be deemed
98. These cases include United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). A more complete list would include the
Court's state sovereign immunity decisions and its decisions restricting the scope of
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
99. See Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Change, supra note 61, at 508 (citing
Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Guess What Happened on the Way to
Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court's Federalism Revolution, 34 PUBLIUS: J. OF
FEDERALISM 85, 103, 105 (2004)) ("Republican Party platforms from the Reagan years
onwards enunciated what Clayton and Pickerill call 'fixed federalism,' demanding firm
judicially enforceable limits on federal power, in contrast to the Democrats' emphasis on
'flexibl[e]' federalism.").
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improper; and whether all but the most modest exactions will be invalidated
as unconstitutionally coercive under the tax power. This Article has
explained, however, why the modern politics of federal power in Congress
render it unlikely that such a constitutional law will come into being.
